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Summary findings
As an essential part of a nation's financial sector  elements that influence the system's quality, and show
infrastructure, securities clearance and settlement systems  how their assessment methodology works. They focus on
must be closely integrated with national payment systems  the development of core principles and minimum
so that safety, soundness, certainty, and efficiency can be  standards for integrated systems of payments and
achieved at a cost acceptable to all participants. Central  securities clearance and settlement.
banks have paid considerable attention to payment  Their paper fills a gap by providing an evaluation tool
systems, but securities clearance and settlement systems  for assessors of such systems, especially those who must
have only recently been subjected to rigorous assessment.  assess evolving systems in developing and transition
The Western Hemisphere Payments and Securities  economies. Essentially, an assessment involves a
Clearance and Settlement Initiative (WHI), led by the  structured analysis to answer four related questions:
World Bank and in cooperation  with the Centro de  *  What are the objective and scope of a securities
Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos (CEMLA), gave  clearance and settlement system?
Guadamillas and Keppler a unique opportunity to  *  Who are the participants, what roles do they play,
observe how various countries in Latin America and the  and what expectations do they have?
Caribbean undertake securities clearance and settlement.  *  What procedures are required to satisfy the
To do so, Guadamillas and Keppler developed a practical  participants'  needs?
and implementable assessment methodology covering  * What inherent risks are involved, and how can they
key issues that affect the quality of such systems.  be mitigated at an acceptable cost?
In this paper they discuss the objectives, scope, and
content  of a typical securities system, identify the
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INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a  methodology to assess securities clearance and settlement systems based on
international  standards  and best practices. The first part of the paper discusses  the major components  of a
typical system and identifies those issues that determine the extent to which the system satisfies the
critical  needs of all stakeholders  for safety, soundness,  certainty  and efficiency at an acceptable  level of
cost.  The issues identified during this discussion  provide the foundation upon which the assessment
methodology is constructed. Although  clearance  and settlement  systems  in all countries  have a range of
common  features  and functions,  it is also clear that local realities  stemming from historical developments
as well as legal and cultural precedents can have a significant influence  on the specifics of a particular
national system.  With this in mind, the assessment methodology described in this paper should be
applied in a way that takes account of both international  standards  and local realities  as it is evident that
no specific common  system  can satisfy  the total needs  of all countries.
The primary policy, organizational,  and operational  facets  of securities  clearance  and settlement systems
can  be identified through a  structured analysis of the answers to  four distinct but interconnected
questions:
*  What is the objective  and scope of a securities  clearance  and settlement  system;
*  Who are the participants,  what roles do they play, and what expectations  do they have;
*  What  procedures are required  to satisfy  participant  needs; and
*  What inherent  risks are involved  and how can they be mitigated  at an acceptable  cost.
OBJECTIVE, SCOPE,  AND ELEMENTS'
A  payment system can be defined as the collection of institutions, instruments, rules, procedures,
standards, and technical means used to exchange financial value between two parties discharging an
obligation. 2 A  securities clearance and settlement system can be considered as part of the overall
payment mechanisms  of a country in that it satisfies the main features  of this overall definition. In this
case the exchange  of financial  value  consists both of the exchange  of securities  (equity,  fixed income, or
derivatives)  and the exchange  of liquid  funds (usually cash or sight deposits).
Regulation  and oversight  of payment  services  have traditionally  been viewed as one of the three pillars of
central banking. The other two are the conduct of monetary  policy and active prudential  supervision 3 of
deposit taking institutions. In terms of securities,  government  securities  have traditionally  received close
attention from the central banks due to the role that they play as the government's bank as well as the
agent of the government  in regard to public debt management. Many central banks have enlarged their
role in the payments systems  field beyond the regulatory  and supervisory  aspects  and provide operational
services that supplement  or complement  services  provided by the private sector. The specific  role filled
I  This section benefits from  the presentation of Keppler, R.H., 1999, Transforming  Payment  Systems:  The
Building  Blocks  and the World  Bank's Role, World Bank/Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY)
Seminar held at FRBNY, April 13-16, 1999.
2  Vid. Listfield, R. and F. Montes-Negret, Modernizing  Payment  Systems  in Emerging  Economies,  August
1994,  Policy  Research  Working Paper  #1936,  The  World, Bank,  Financial  Sector  Development
Department.
3  Vid. Padoa-Schiopa, 1992, La  Moneta  e it Sistema  de Pagamenti.
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by central banks differ from country  to country and can include the provision of special purpose large
value, time-critical, funds transfer systems, bulk low value electronic systems, including automated
clearing  house services,  and government  securities  clearance  and settlement  services.
The private sector, on the other hand, has traditionally  provided most of the services for clearance and
settlement of non-government  securities.  Moreover, in some countries, especially those in the early
stages of capital markets development,  comprehensive  and rigorous attention to regulatory issues is
sometimes lacking as initial major emphasis is placed, quite naturally,  on matters relating to operational
efficiency and cost.  Today,  securities  clearance and settlement systems are recognized as having the
same inherent risks as those associated with systemically important payment mechanisms.  Both the
efficiency  and the safety 4 and soundness  aspects of these systems  are now receiving  closer attention  from
domestic  securities  regulators  as well as international  organizations. In essence,  the initial  prominent role
played by the private sector in the implementation  and operation of securities systems is now being
replaced by a combination  of roles shared between  the private  and public sectors with specific and well
defined roles being assigned  to the securities  regulator.
The key attributes of a securities  clearance and settlement system can best be illustrated by examining
each of the elements contained  in the definition  of a payments  system presented above, i.e., institutions,
instruments,  rules, procedures,  standards,  and technical  means.
Institutions provide  the infrastructure  to clear and settle securities  transactions. Two types of institutions
are  involved and  include "participants" that participate directly or  indirectly in the clearance and
settlement  process  (clearinghouses,  settlement  agents, service  providers)  or regulatory  bodies  that provide
the regulatory framework to clear and settle securities  in an orderly and safe way as well as providing
overall oversight  for the entire system.
Instruments are the vehicles used for transferring  value. Two types of instruments  are used. On the one
hand, there are the securities  which, in a broad sense, include  equity, fixed income and derivatives.  On
the other hand, there is the payments instrument  which is used to transfer funds from the buyer of the
securities  to the seller. 'rhe specific instrument  used to discharge  the payment  leg of the obligation  varies
and it is dependent on the participants  to the transaction  and the value of the associated payment. This
relationship underscores  the importance of an efficient and safe payments clearance and settlement
system and its interconnectivity  with the efficiency  and safety of the securities  clearance and settlement
system. This interdependence  will be discussed  again in several sections  of this paper.
Rules  refer to the required legal and administrative  framework including statutory, regulatory, and
contractual rules that govern the rights and obligations of parties to a transaction.  A  fumdamental
ingredient of any efficient clearance and settlement system is a  clear, comprehensible, sensible and
enforceable (at low cost) legal regime. Technological  innovation  is having a major impact on the legal,
regulatory and administrative  arrangements;  for example, on the need to ensure that the judicial system
4  These  concepts  include:  speed  of settlement,  certainty  of settlement  (correct  amount,  correct  party, correct
date, clear understanding  when  finality occurs),  reliability  (availability,  in accordance  with rules and
regulations),  safety  and  soundness  (to ensure  againstfraud,  credit  and  systemic  risk,  privacy),  convenience
(easy access, consistent with technological  capabilities),  cost (realistic,  consistent  with the service
provided),  universality  (equitable  basis  by allfinancial  institutions,  interface  with  other  systems).
5  This paper  is not focused  on the specific details of derivatives clearance and settlement.  For a detailed
analysis  of  these  issues  vid  BIS,  September  1998,  OTC  Derivatives:  Settlement  Procedures  and
Counterparty  Risk  Management,  and  March  1997,  Clearing  Arrangements  for  Exchange-Traded
Derivatives.
2SECURITIES CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
accept electronic  records as evidentiary  material  and that digital signatures  have the same attached rights
and obligations  as physical  written signatures.
The securities  clearance and settlement  procedures vary significantly  from one country to another.  In
some cases, the domestic  procedures  will differ depending  on the specific nature  of the securities  that are
being traded.  Typically, procedures have evolved over time and reflect market practices, conditions,
tradition and culture. Today, there is a clear trend towards  the use of electronic  clearance  and settlement
mechanisms. A cornerstone  of such systems is the role played by central securities  depositories  (CSDs).
Establishing a CSD results in increases both in efficiency and safety through the immobilization of
securities  and their safe storage  in the CSD as contrasted  with the old arrangements  in which the "scrip"
was actually held by the  investor.  Another benefit usually relates to the  issue of securities in a
dematerialized or book-entry form.  Despite this common evolutionary path, there  are still many
variations  in the way in which CSDs  operate at the detailed  level.
The most recent factor  that has been introduced  into the world of clearance  and settlement  concerns the
role of standards. Standards are required  to facilitate  the efficient exchange  of data between computer
systems and also underpin the drive  towards straight-through-processing  in which the entire end-to-end
or customer-to-customer  transaction  flow can be computerized. The use of a common set of standards  is
also essential in facilitating the integration of national systems into efficient and closely integrated
international  systems. Today, a wide variety  of international  institutions  and organizations6  are involved
with the development of standards.  In some cases, these standards  have been established to realize
specific purposes and relate primarily to a specific system or group of systems and thus may not be
applicable  to all systems. In addition,  it should  be noted that not every system, especially  during  the early
evolution of securities markets in a country, can or must satisfy all of the standards  that have been
promulgated. From a practical perspective,  the primary need is the availability  of a set of standards  and
implementation  guidelines  that have applicability  to securities  markets  at different stages  of development
in mature, transitional, and developing economies.  To achieve this end, substantial work is now
underway at the international  level regarding standards  development. It is worth noting that this work,
quite appropriately, reflects the close interrelationship  between securities transfer systems and funds
transfer systems. 7
Finally, the technical means provide the tools, and operational  infrastructure  for transmitting financial
value between participants and intermediaries  throughout the processing cycle.  As mentioned above
technological  innovation is providing significant  opportunities  to reduce operational  costs and improve
the speed and the security  with which information  can be processed. However,  technological  innovation
is also introducing  new challenges,  especially  in regard  to the need  for appropriate  legislative  changes.
PARTICIPANTS  IN SECURITIES  CLEARANCE  AND SETTLEMENT  SYSTEMS
A broad range of institutions  and entities are involved  in securities clearance and settlement systems.
Regulatory authorities (mainly central banks, superintendencies  of banks and securities regulators)
create the legal and oversight  environment  within which the procedures  are carried out. Sometimes  they
also provide  clearance  and settlement  services,  mainly in the case of government  securities. Participants
are those institutions  that send/receive  orders directly  to/from  the system or which are directly  bound by
6  Box 4 present a list of some of the standards  and best  practices  issued  by international  institutions  and
organizations.
7  The CPSS (BIS) and IOSCO have initiated a joint effort to develop a comprehensive list of standards with
applicability to all critical aspects of securities clearance and settlement  systems.
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the rules governing  securities  transfer  systems. Direct  participants  directly  exchange  transfer  orders with
other participants in the system on  behalf of themselves, their customers or on  behalf of indirect
participants. Indirect  participants are distinguished  from direct participants  by their inability  to perform
certain activities  such as input of transfer orders  or acting as a settlement  agent. The typical participants
are described below along with a note of the functions  that they perform and the services they provide.
However, as will be noted, the roles of participants  are not unique and do vary from country  to country
and from system to  system.  For example, some of the services/functions  undertaken by a  specific
participant could  be  provided/performed by  separate entities, or  some  of  the  services/functions
provided/performed  by several  participants  could be provided/performed  by a single participant.
Final investors are the individual  economic agents in an economy (households and firms) that invest
surplus funds or savings with the objective of earning an attractive return on their investment.  They
normally  trade in securities  markets  through an intermediary,  broker/dealer  or an institutional  investor.
Institutional investors (mainly, banks, mutual funds, pension funds, and  insurance companies) are
playing an increasingly  important  role in securities  markets. The high volume and value of transactions
carried out by these institutions  place them in a pivotal role in the clearing and settlement processes.
International  standards  recognize  the importance  of their role and recommend  that although  they usually
are  not direct participants in the trading mechanisms, they should have direct participation in the
confirmation/comparison/affirmation  processes.
Both, final and institutional  investors are customers of the securities clearance and settlement system.
They are buyers, sellers or holders of securities  and funds. However, they do not participate directly in
the clearance  and settlement  arrangements.
Issuers are institutions  that seek financing  via the securities  markets; thus, are obliged to pay interest or
dividends  and redeem the principal  on securities  issued  by them.  They are normally classified  as public
or private issuers. This distinction  is important  as countries  often have different systems for processing
trades in the public and private securities  markets. In addition,  the public securities  market is normally
regulated by the central bank whereas private securities  markets are regulated by a separate securities
regulatory  authority. However, in some countries,  where securities  regulators  do not exist,  central banks
typically  assume the overall regulatory  responsibility.
Broker-Dealers  undertake the primary intermediation  role in securities  market trading.  For this reason
they also have a primary  role in the clearance  and settlement  procedures. It is worth mentioning that the
evolution and automation of the securities clearance and settlement systems is deeply affecting this
segment of the industry.  In particular,  the design of the system, especially its impact on the liquidity
needs that must be funded  by these institutions,  constitute  sometimes  a significant  operational  constraint.
This can present particular  difficulties  for broker-dealers  that focus on the retail sector.
Custodians are entities that undertake  the safekeeping  of securities  and other financial instruments on
behalf of others. They may provide other services such as clearance  and settlement, securities  lending,
etc. A Global  Custodian  provides  those services  in respect of securities  traded and settled  not only in the
country where the custodian  is located  but also in other  countries  throughout  the world.
Central Securities  Depositories  (CSDs)  provide-facilities  for holding securities  in either immobilized  or
book-entry form. In addition to providing  this safekeeping  role, a CSD may provide trade comparison
services, and clearing and settlement  services.
International Central Securities  Depositories  (ICSDs) are institutions  that settle trades in international
securities  and in various domestic  securities. They usually  settle the trades in their own books or through
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direct or indirect  links (through  local agents)  to domestic  CSDs.
Exchanges and Over the Counter (OTC) markets are the mechanisms  for trading activity  carried out by
broker-dealers. Prices are determined  by auction bidding  on the floor of an exchange  or by negotiation
(through  telephone  communications,  computer-controlled  networks of quotation  terminals,  etc.) between
buying and selling broker-dealers  in the case of OTC markets.  The key factor from a clearing and
settlement perspective  is the way in which trading information  is transmitted  rather than on the way in
which trading takes place.
The clearing agent is the entity that carries out the procedures  of trade capture, matching,  confirmation
and calculation of obligations relating to securities transfer instructions prior to  settlement.  These
functions  are normally  provided  by CSDs  together  with the depository  function  or by the exchange  where
the trading takes place. Sometimes  the clearing agent assumes  counterparty  risk by netting  the aggregate
positions of the participants in a process referred  to as "novation". In this case, the clearing agent also
performs  the settlement  function.
A settlement  agent manages  the settlement  process,  determines  the settlement  positions  and monitors  the
exchange  of securities  and payments. Again,  this function  is sometimes  provided  by CSDs  or exchanges.
The payment of funds is usually done through a settlement  bank (private  bank or central  bank), although
in some situations is directly done by the broker/dealer  or its paying agent through a means of payment
such as a check or a certified  check.
A  correspondent bank provides payments and other services to  another bank.  Such services are
primarily provided across intemational  boundaries. It is included in this list because of its relevance to
cross-border  securities  transactions  and especially  in regard to the role it plays in the payments  leg of the
transaction.
SECURITIES  CLEARANCE  AND  SETTLEMENT  PROCEDURES
After a trade is executed in an exchange or an OTC market there are still a number of stages to be
followed in order to  achieve an  effective transfer of value (securities vs.  payment) between the
counterparties. These procedures  can be quite different  from one country  to another  and even in the way
that different  securities  are traded within  a country. This section  describes  the key aspects  of this process.
An exhaustive  treatment of the many variations and local conditions  embedded in such systems around
the world is not attempted. The primary purpose is to illustrate  the key issues that authorities should
consider when striving  to achieve  an appropriate  balance  between  safety and efficiency. To cover the full
range of unique characteristics  encountered  in specific countries  is beyond the scope of this paper. This
task is being performed by intemational organizations  that have published or are in the process of
publishing reports describing  the specific operational  and regulatory mechanisms embedded in specific
national systems. 8
8  The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the central banks of the Group of Ten
countries  periodically publishes - under the aegis of the Bank  for International Settlements (www.bis.org)-
reference works on payment  systems in various countries, the so-called Red Books.  Volumes that are
similar  to the  Red Book format  have  also been issued by  the European  Monetary Institute  (for the
European Union countries) and by the Executives' Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks and
Monetary  Authorities (for the EMEAP member countries). "The Green Book", covering the countries of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been produced  by  the SADC Payment System
Project  Team  under  the  auspices  of  the  SADC  Committee  of  Central Bank  Governors.  The  WHI
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Box 1  presents the typical procedures  that are undertaken  in a securities  clearance  and settlement  system.
The lifecycle  of a securities  transaction  involves  three phases: trade execution,  trade clearance, and trade
settlement. 9 These procedures should be designed and developed to work within a specific legal and
operating environment and thus take account of local regulatory and oversight arrangements.  An
understanding  of these latter factors is essential as they influence  the way in which the procedures are
used and thus contribute  to any inherent risks embedded in the system.  The nature of the operational
environment is  assuming increasing importance in most  countries as technological innovation is
changing  the way that information  is processed and managed  and thus has an impact  on all other factors.
The way the authorities adapt to the new operational  conditions  is critical to maintaining  efficient and
safe systems. It is thus clear, that both the legal and regulatory  oversight  arrangements  need to evolve in
line with  technology  driven changes  in operational  procedures.
inttBuying  t  i  Buying  tEx  Chon  A  Selling  ini  Selling  r
Books", Cusering  both  payments  and  securities  clerance  and  s  eBroker  f  Ln Customer  a
9  Vid. tehm,  , Apri  1996,Clearace  andSettlement  SsesfrScrte:Ciia  einCocsi
Emerging  Market  Economies  World  Bank  Discussion  Pap,  N.  3
Pay;0  7  ing00  '  A  gent'6
2.iei  te client's<:t.*  ffW  tae  dtail of trnation  ex  aeted.  f 
fww.iphe-whpf.org)  seords  nato  d by  C  hearn  Agetrad BrnkanCEML,wtrstiiaino  bodrneo
intitten  thradoeeugitIneationcubonal  Advisrety  between theC  isnerlabratieng  asaitiaeorts,  b  Yelleen
Bok"  coveringse  bothrog  payentscupoc  s  and  seuiiscommranicatnd  se5ttement  foais  comerocn  tatd
Caribbean Region.
9  Vid.  Stehm,  J., April 1996,  Clearance  and Settlement  Systems  for Securities:  Critical  Design Choices  in
Emerging  Market  Economies,  World  Bank Discussion Papers, No. 321.
6SECURITIES  CLEARANCE  AND  SETTLEMENTSYSTEMS
TRADE  CLEARANCE,
Trade  CaptureM:atchimg/ConfirmatbofComparisou  and  Affirmation
4.  Brkers,  both  buying  and  selling.  semd  to the  Clearing  Ae-t  a  details Broke deliver  a
c5 The  to their  custers  co  ghe detail O  custome?s  ex cited  orders.
S.  The  Clring  Agent  com  each  side of  the trade  and  trep  vaq brq.,
6.  For  lare  itutd  iesrthe  confirnation  is nrall  direted  tD  an it  ry  such  as a
custodian acing  as agent "for  he investor in the cleaing proces
During  tht phae the inftmadonflow continues  untii  there  are  nw  msae  Jn  trade  deta.  In
some  cases those procses m  y occur  outsid of the  lewing-  ee  Irad
executonprocess  When  the trd  are  *4.nsmited  as 'oked-lW  itwactliw y$e  r
sstems;qf  the echnge  or  r  market, the  d  f  e  es hw  t*ed
Id&,-all  cemp"in  of trades  bedween  matii  *mW  br  key  tw.
Calculatilo  of  settlemet  oblgatio
7.  The  Clearing  Aget sends  to the  brokes,  custo4ianad  a  sede  FiJd  s
(gross,  bilatal net  or multiea  net)  and  the  fnd b  :i  l1  at(gross,  lm  t  or
net). In  case  ofmiakes, t  inormation  fO  continues  nil the  besare  coe
The  selling  broker  must  provide  aiaility  of securities  befoe  the  ttime,t  ad  he 
buying  broke must  provide  availabiliy  of funds  befor the  -im  ---.
Avaiaility of securities
*  &ecurities in book-entfM:  .mmobilzed and demaeriaized serities  are availe
throuh the  broker's  acconts  in the  4iotory  Normally,  Ie  :w  - -trf  se*it  trade
are bloced unil the rade is setd4e and  cann  be  used  for  other  trads  hse
days.
2§e  T2WJhm:Yhe  brokersholdmakethemavaiable  . the  :  ett..:e  . da.
Availabiy of  fUnds
*  Pamen  hgh  asetm  agent  In this care brokr  or it  -yn  genaha.  an
account  at the  settlement gnt  *ualy a b  aand  t  learing 
balances  to the settlement  agewnt fore setalme  day.  &Oker%,  pyta  t 
b.azks  or custodians  sendthefinus bore  eement  t-  - .
*  Diec  PaMe  by t  &k.  In this case buying  brker  4irecty  povide  thends  at
settlement  time by a  n&ns of payment  (e.g., acheck, ceitifled  a direc
paymen through its paying agent to the selling broker.
In some  occions the  dearing  agn  guarantees  the  trade  netng he  d  wiy  ad  recet  of
settleet  obligations. This  is referred  to as "novadon"w  or t  oe  parfor
ano  (the  clearng  agenbecomethe  - rto ev  sreler nd  theselerto  eer  b-w)y4  hT
most  markets  trade  clkaae  &pksHy  rangesfrm  T+l to T+S.
TRADE  SETTLEMENr
8.  Securities  are delivered  in  exchange  of finds.
Delivery  of securities
*  Through  a Depository  (securities  ar  previously  immobZized  in the depository  or issu  in a
dematerialized  form)
*  Diectly between  the brokens  (physicai  form  of securities)
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of scurthe  frog a  certainmeunt Agefntso  atclrstlmn  ae  h  rnato  eal  ol
be  agreddirectly  between  the  brokersntbypartiesTanso  aym iont  (  ete.g,c  enk  bertiferdcek)saeomal
9.rThed  olutin  ar  exhanagl  oregiTemrkedntheenra  Boxk  aicountrtes  the  se  ofd  wil  trasaciona  urolessethog
aexhneinte seteds1  by  and 3ia  Frscleaion ceadstlmn.upsstefc  htataei  xctdi
Snexcuratie  are  OTCarkferred nthroighnihclarignttwt.itscldlvr  o  hog  ok
Taecearntcssem.  reer the  laht  case,  durtes  depository  is  o  determninstttin  the  obliations  ogen  dinsructmre
paticpet  dboepsorydeales,d  t.  thmovdem  ienroh  securities takeuns  polachouigh thae  dxepository I  inccunts
trd Fcpure,  smttlcheng,cnt  ain,  ulcb  o  mpadreityon  ane  bffrokers/delrsoyc  edurs  (stpsymento6i box  thr  agh
the  cacuaymen  o  gnf  o  cnrlze  nesettlement  obiainage  7i  o  )  nen  ta  t raeeies  andcupay  the  inexse  disectly
reod(athroug  the  brkers  inormaits  peaying  aeto  thetrpaye  oandciv the  monuey  oha  the  counticrpaties  bgehalfo
allof  eias  anyi  the  casen  of  phurnscinan  r  blct  seuiies,  fod  bothfecritiese  tandfud,te settilemethnt  isd
dofnntone.  trug  the Cexhntraor  OaTk  accounts  tdeanlsecuitis shouled-n  teades,veraed  m,athnd  sl done
Thjpocessy  weinswihhh trade execution  adllteephase.dThes  tou parutisagreeul  wtoxhange  aelcertai aounth
inofscriatiefor  ay  herti  ecanount  of  fundsion  anetr  particulate  settlementddate.cTheotransbactio  detmailsy  acul
be agreeds  directlye  bnestoreenth  two clenterpaties.eTransactionscestween broker/dalers, andrec  nomallyt
carriiedaots  (instanuexchalngestors  aTd  markt.dianB)x  1u  ilutoae the  casvlue  ofa theransacationprcsse  pathroughe
in  exchane  in  sstep  2  ian  3  orceane  af  n  settl  ademe  purpoesthel a  ta  sa  t
ane  exlchlangen  or  settlemaretsnot  sbigainiscant.  oeo  rS,2  iaea  e,1  r  utltrlnt1
Itra  sde  ffculeaat rfr  to  thedscoue  proceduarkes  necessaryins  thos  deterin othie  ob  rlgtos  ofd  diectanmarket
prticogipantst(boker/dealgers,  etc.  otoheier  securnitiesad fundsrefolltowng  maktrande  bdexeuto.  Tit  icludtesa
trdeffcapture  macing,h confirmatcfeuion,s  cmparasnc  and  afftlrmantio  procemsdures(tp4  to  6h  inablt  box  mondto
thencalulationl  ofrettlrements  obligation (stepd7rin  box 1).One  beavo  tradie wisxcted  the  dofonexct,  sepsto.
records  (capse)  the koeytinom  atio  re  lating  to  thra  e  tradess  andg  oasr.ht  h  oneptiareuo
joiThe weiths andinsedits trade  execution  pracedures  o  siutaneously  th  the del  ieryt  oofth
inofscrmatiefon  by therti  ecange.t  of  foreigon  inetr  participate intthemtrading;.custodiansbankso  normailly  actul
as agrents  forethese inestorsen  the  clearouncerandtses.Tlementtprocess.wIn  sromer/casers,  indrec  nomarket
participants (is  tutonal  ienveto and cuditsetod  due  entioe  the  hh  olme  off  thder opertions,  participantues
the calculation of settlement obligations caep7  n beone 1.Onc a  gross,  biateraltd,th  net,xoutilatera ne  to
secogd  stock  exchangesnorm  other  recognized  selfre  and  bn  oditesathies  cgreates  a
dllofilthe inrms  of  the  performansceio secuarites  aleaoran  and  settl  t ssthemsdue  tohe  itabilit  (atog  mni
coThisrpaseisn.I smtimes  referrede  tora  OTradket Procesming.  okdi"trdsrd  athn  sdn
joitl  wth  tae  sete  entocursioandivdallyo  anes  ordr-yoreduesocr  bsis.  tnosy  ihtedlieyo  h
inor3  to  T  yhe  deitxadcranedits  betweegn  anyetw  oprtcpns  partiiae  se  th  offn;cstda  ak  nralc
'Eahparticipant's  (nttotioal  deinetor  and cretditns)du to the  entir  systmuae  offst  theaing  thertos participantewt 
single nraet  pospaition  inyeltion  toithe enstire  system.to  ftaedtis
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basis for both the securities  balances and the funds balances.  The choice is not irrelevant.  On the
contrary, it impacts very importantly  the efficiency and risk exposure of the system.  In addition, this
choice is influenced  by market  characteristics,  especially  those relating  to the availability  of liquidity. As
it will be made clear later in this section, the principle strengths and weaknesses of the two methods
require careful study and always result in tradeoffs between liquidity requirements  and risk mitigation,
especially  those risks relating  to settlement  failure. Gross settlement  systems eliminate  risk, but require
more liquidity  than net settlement systems. However,  net settlement  systems  have increased  risk due to
the deferred  nature of the settlement  process.
Box 2.  Trade confirmation/comparison/affirmation
Trade  comparison  |
type  i  Description
Locked-in  .The  Exchange  or OTC  market  deliver  trades  of its participants  on a locked-in
b  basis,  ta  is,  the trades  are already  matched.
Theinformation  on securities  traded  by its participants  is submitted  to  the
clearing  agent  by the excharge  or OTC  market,  which  compares  and  matches
Matched  I  the buy  and  sell  sides  of Xt trades.Comparison  members  subriit  the trade
dat and the clearing  agent  send  confinnation  reports  to comparison  members
that  validat the compason of the trade  data.
Finally, settlement  involves the discharge  of settlement  obligations  through the final transfer  of securities
from the seller  to the buyer, and the final transfer of funds from the buyer  to the seller. Again,  this could
be done by a variety of procedures  but two elements  represented  by the concept of Final Delivery versus
Payment (FDvP)' 5 are critical. This means that securities should be delivered if, and only if, there is
payment and vice versa, i.e., on a Delivery versus Payment (DvP) basis.  But as important as the
previous  concept is that transactions  are final, i.e., that the securities  and funds legs cannot be reversed,  it
should also be noted that finality is affected by the particularities  of legal and judicial systems. Thus,
legal issues such as the concept of nominee or the provisions  embedded in bankruptcy  laws should be
seriously considered by the  authorities to ensure consistency with securities laws, regulations and
operational  procedures.
Clearly, securities clearance and settlement systems are characterized  by many features and functions.
Experience indicates  that three features  are especially significant  when designing a country assessment
methodology as they represent core system design issues with varying solutions  each having associated
strengths  and weaknesses. They are: (a) the instruments  themselves  which can be either paper-based  or
held solely as computer records, (b) the role of CSDs, and (c) the use of gross versus net settlement
schemes.
Systems typically evolve from an initial use of paper-based instruments with physical delivery of
certificates between  counterparties to  computer-based transfer  mechanisms in  which  records  of
ownership  are held in so-called  book-entry  form. Evolution  usually  takes place in two steps. The initial
step comprises  immobilization  in which the paper instruments  are stored in a secure location or locations
rather than being held by the individual  investors. The second  step is concerned  with dematerialization  in
which paper instruments are replaced by computer records.  Clearly the pace of evolution is heavily
dependent on the availability of appropriate technology, and the size of the market in terms of both
volume of securities  issued  and traded and the number  of active investors. Technological  innovation  has
5  This concept  is referred  sometimes  as true DvP or real DvP.
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reduced equipment and telecommunications  costs and has facilitated  the trend to move away from the
physical  delivery of instruments. This is not only a more efficient  mechanism  but also a safer one as it
eliminates the movement of paper and thus reduces associated  risks such as those relating  to lost, stolen,
or altered documents  In an immobilized  system, physical certificates are held in secure vaults and
provide  the essential support  for book-entry  maintained  ownership  positions  of market  participants. In a
dematerialized  system, physical securities  do not exist as they are replaced by book-entry records.  In
such systems  the individual  investor  has an interest right in a pool of fungible  securities.
Key issues to be addressed when contemplating  the elimination  of physical delivery relate to the legal
framework and the attitudes of investors.  A  legal framework which is appropriate for paper-based
systems does not readily accommodate  immobilization  or dematerialization. Normally, amendments  to
laws are required, and depending  on the legal system  of the country,  this can take a long  time and should
be taken into account. In many situations,  individual  investors  have more confidence in a system which
allows them to hold physical securities despite the associated risks.  In moving to book-entry based
systems, it is frequently necessary to wean investors away from this practice by providing an initial
option to hold securities  in either format as well as the option  to change from one fornat to the other. A
market strategy  based on incentive pricing coupled  with the dematerialization  of all new issues can then
be used to progressively  move toward  full dematerialization.
Figure 1. Number of CSD Organizations
140
120~~~~~~~~~~~~2
100  x  - :
80
60  ..  ..
40
0 ,2  _  __  _  __
20
1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  1999  2000*
*  Includes  20 operational  and/or  planned  CSDs.
Source: Thomas  Murray,  "Evaluating  Local  Market  Custody  Arrangements"
A second important  improvement  initiative,  closely related to that described above, is the establishment
of central securities depositories/registries  (CSDs) (see Figure 1).  These institutions are created to
facilitate  the smooth and efficient  operation  of book-entry  systems. CSDs provide  key services including
securities ownership recordkeeping and custody of physical certificates in  irnmobilization  regimes.
However, in some systems there are still requirements for  post-settlement processing such as the
updating  of share registers and the issue of replacement  certificates. CSDs usually perform the clearing
agent function and  sometimes they  also provide dividend and  interest payments services.  These
institutions  are normally  private firms with a non-profit  objective and are constituted  as Self Regulatory
Organizations (SROs) under the oversight of the securities market regulator.  The use of the word
"central" can be misleading,  as there can be several  depositories  in a country rather than only one.  The
number of depositories  depend  on the complexity  and size of the market. Nevertheless,  today there is a
trend towards centralizing all the securities  clearance  and settlement  activity of a country in one single
CSD with possibly  a number of linked  sub-depositories.
A gross settlement  system requires a critical  mass of marketable  securities  and system-wide  liquidity for
its efficient  operation. Systemic  risk in gross settlement  systems is low as transactions  are not executed
unless there are securities and funds in the accounts of the counterparties. The relatively recent and
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rapidly growing use  of  real  time gross settlement systems' 6 reduces credit and  liquidity risk in
comparison with batch processing systems.  1 7 However,  the associated liquidity needs may represent a
significant constraint to the adoption of these systems in securities  markets, as participants are mainly
broker/dealers that typically lack the amount of liquidity required for the smooth operation of such
systems,  unless they are owned by or have a close relationship  to a commercial  bank. For this reason,  the
choice of settlement mechanism is not straightforward. It could affect the evolution of the market in
terms of the dominant  institutions  (banks vs. non bank dependent  broker/dealers)  and the pattern of the
market towards  a retail or wholesale  dominance.'8 As a consequence,  gross settlement  systems are more
frequently used to remove the risks embedded in large-value  funds transfers systems in which the main
participants  are banks that have access to intraday liquidity  provided  by the central bank within carefully
controlled arrangements. Well designed gross settlement  systems typically include queue management
procedures and other mechanisms such as bilateral and multilateral offset arrangements to mitigate
against the impact  of so called  gridlock'9 in the system.
Net systems,  because of the deferred nature of settlement,  avoid the need for large amounts of intraday
liquidity,  however  the specific  volume and value of transactions  flows should be studied  to determine  the
potential  for risk. By reducing  the overall  value of the final funds transfers  that have to be made between
participating  financial  institutions,  netting can enhance  the efficiency  of national payments systems. But
netting  can also contribute  to an increase in systemic  risk. This may be the case if, instead of achieving
reductions in participants' true exposures, it merely obscures the level of these exposures.  The true
position  becomes  apparent only when the net positions  are identified  at the end of the clearing cycle. At
this point, shortages of either securities or funds are identified.  Should appropriate cover not be
available,  then in the simple case, transactions  have to be unwound  with the obvious negative impact on
system participants and market confidence.  Well designed netting systems can mitigate against these
implications by invoking previously agreed settlement assurance  procedures.  Such procedures can be
quite costly and are sometimes  quite difficult  to put in place. In some system arrangements,  the clearing
agent guarantees settlement and in effect becomes the counterparty  to each trade.  This mechanism is
referred  to as novation and requires  that a supporting legal environment  is in place.
Operational  systems,  especially  those in transition,  often exhibit  a combination  of gross and net schemes.
For example, it is not uncommon  to see systems  that combine  securities  gross settlement  with funds net
settlement. The BIS made an effort to categorize  the range of existing systems 20 using different flavors
of the concept of DvP, already mentioned. It should also be noted that the boundaries  between real time
gross settlement  systems and net settlement  systems  are becoming  blurred. An increasing  number of net
settlement systems now settle periodically  during  the day rather than solely at the end of the day. This
reduces the potential for settlement failure by reducing the progressive build-up of credit exposures
between participants. Also, as noted earlier, gridlock  busting routines in gross settlement  arrangements
make use of embedded  net settlement  off-set  concepts. This  trend is continuing  and it is likely that some
form of final convergence  between  these mechanisms  will take place.
16  A gross settlement system in which processing and settlement  take place in real time (continuously).
17  Processing of a group of securities transfer instructions and/or  payment orders at a set of discrete intervals
of time.
18  The debate about this issue is broader and covers other areas such as equal regulatory treatment.
19  Situation in which the  failure of some transfer instructions  to be executed  prevents a substantial number of
instructions  from other participants  from being executed
20  BIS (CPSS), September 1992, Delivery  versus  payment  in securities  settlement  systems.
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In  order to  clarify and  quantify the points  previously developed, let's  assume a  market with k
broker/dealers and only one traded security.  Matrix T represents the transactions carried over by
broker/dealers in this market.  An item in the matrix, tj, represents the value of securities bought by
broker/dealer  i from broker/dealer  j.21 In a gross seftlement  system, matrix T represents the number  and
value of transactions  as well as the number  and value of settlement  operations. If transactions  are settled
on a bilateral basis, the number  and net value of settlement  operations are represented  by Matrix N.  In
this case, n 1j, represents  the net position  of broker/dealer  i against  broker/dealer  j.  If the net system  uses a
multilateral  basis, the number and value of settlement operations  is represented  by matrix M, in which
each element of the matrix,  mi, represents  the multilateral  net position  of each broker/dealer.
Matrix T  Matrix  N  Matrix  M
O  tf2 t13 ..  tlk  0  nI2  n,3  nik  m
t21  0  t23  ...  t2k  0  0  n23 n2k  ?2
t31  t3 2 0  ...  t3k  °  0  0  ...  . 3k
m3
tkl  tk2  tk3  ...  0  0  0  0  ...  0  O
ni = |tij-tiil  mij =  t ti-E  tij
}=1  11
Table I shows  the type of settlement  in combination  with the number  and value of settlement  operations.
22 In a gross settlement system the number and value of settled operations  is higher than in net systems,
i.e., the liquidity  needs of the system is potentially  higher. The analysis could be made more exhaustive
by assuming a combination  of different  types of settlement  for the securities leg and the payments leg,
but it would complicate  the exposition  without  affecting  the conclusions. However,  as mentioned earlier,
it is not uncommon  to see systems  that combine securities  gross settlement with funds net settlement or
other type of combinations.
Table 1. Number of Settlement  Operations  and Liquidity  Needs by Settlement  Type
Settlement  Type  Number of Settlement  Value of Settlement
Settlement  Type  ~Operations  Operations
k  k
Gross  k (k-I)  E  iti
i=l  j=1
k  k
Bilateral Net  k (k-1)/2  E  E  n
i=l  j=l
Multilateral  Net  k  mi
i=l
21  For  simplicity  purposes,  it is assumed  that each item  in the matrix,  ty, represents  a single  operation,  thus,
matrix  T provides  the  information  about  the  number  of operations  (one per  item)  and  the  value.  It  is
assumed,  also for  simplicity  purposes,  that there are no transactions  within  a broker.
22  Note  that  in  this  case,  the  number  and  value  of transactions  is the  same  as  the number  and  value  of
settlement  operations,  unlike the case of net systems.
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In order to analyze what happens if there is a fail in the system, let's suppose that broker/dealer I  is
unable to deliver funds on settlement date for the transaction  executed with broker/dealer  2.  That is,
transaction  t12 cannot be executed. Table 2 shows  the number  and value of transactions  affected. In this
case, a gross settlement  system  would  be less affected both in terms of number and value of transactions.
The multilateral  net system  will be the most affected due to the need for recalculation  of multilateral  net
positions.
Table 2. Number and Value  of Transactions  Affected by a Settlement  Fail
Settlement Type  Number of Transactions  Value of Transactions  Affected ype  ~~~Aiffected
Gross  Itij
Bilateral Net  2  tj  + tj,
k  k
Multilateral  Net  2k-3  Ztij  + ,ti2
J=l  1=1
Box 3  Exampe of GrOss  versus  Ne  Settement Systems
Let's assume 4 broker dealers operating  in a market  with a single security. Matrix A represents  the
transactions  in the market. The rows show  the value  of purchases  by brokersadealers  while  the columns
represent  the value  of sales by brokers/dealers.  The result  of tables  I and 2 of the text are presented  below
for this specific example clarifying the conclusions already presented in the text.
Matrix A
0  10  15  20
20  0  30  15
35  20  0  10
5  15  40  O
Number  of Setlement  Operatons  and  Number  and Value  of Transactions  Affected  by
Liquidity  Needs  by Settment Type  a Setement Fail
ANumber  of  Value  of  Number  of  Yalue  af
settlement  settlement  trawactions  transactions
Settlement  typ  operations  oSerations  - Settlement  type  affected  affcted
Gross  12  215  Gross  I  10
Bilateral  net  6  85  _  __Biiateral  net-ert  2  _  30
Multilateral  net  4  60  Multilateral  net  S 
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ExPOSURE TO RISK WITHN THE SYSTEM
Clearing and settlement procedures expose participants  to a number of risks.  Maintaining acceptable
levels of safety and soundness is a primary regulatory objective. More recently the regulatory role has
been expanded to include system efficiency as an equally important objective.  Risks 23 stem from
weaknesses in system  design and can have their origin in any of the following: (a) rules and procedures,
(b) institutional  arrangements,  (c) participants,  (d) technical mechanisms, and (e) the need for implicit
and/or explicit  extension of credit. The specific  major risks are discussed  in the following  paragraphs.
Credit risk is the risk that a counterparty  will not settle an obligation  for full value, either when due or at
any time thereafter. It involves both  the replacement  cost risk and  principal risk. Replacement cost risk
is the loss of unrealized gains on unsettled  contracts  due to changes in securities  market prices between
the time a trade is executed and the time that it is settled. The exposure depends on the market price
volatility  and the time gap between  trade date and settlement  date. Principal risk is the risk that the full
value of securities  or funds will be lost by either the seller or buyer, when the respective  counterparty
fails to settle.  This risk can be eliminated by introducing  an acceptable form of DvP. 24 Third party
credit risk arises when settlement  participants  are permnitted  or required  to use banks or intermediaries  to
guarantee or provide settlement  funds and fail to perform,  whether or not  the settlement  participant has
perforned its obligations.
Liquidity risk is defined as the risk that a counterparty  will not settle an obligation  for full value when
due, but on some unspecific date thereafter. If a counterparty  fails to settle, it does not always mean that
it is insolvent.  The reason could be a failure in the technology being used (a computer failure), a
transitory liquidity problem or a "cascading" effect from other failed transactions. However, it is very
difficult to determine  ex-ante if the counterparty  is having a liquidity  or solvency  problem. Moreover, in
some situations,  an unresolved  liquidity  problem could result in subsequent  insolvency. In any case, the
implication  for the non-defaulting  counterparty  might well be the need to liquidate  assets, borrow funds
or borrow securities.
Operational risk stems from breakdowns  in internal  controls, failure  to follow procedures or inability  to
follow procedures. Operational  weaknesses  or failures can result in specific problems  such as credit or
liquidity problems and indeed can create the potential  for fraud.  Sufficient  attention should be given to
the need for appropriate logical and physical security arrangements,  especially those relating to data
integrity including  the use of rigorous  encryption  and message authentication/non-repudiation  procedures
as well as strong system  access controls.
Legal risk stems from ambiguity or uncertainty in the rules governing the clearance and settlement
process.  In an environment  with widespread legal uncertainty,  participants may view the systems as
being unreliable, and unfair.  Legal risks can also impede the ability of paymnent  system operators to
manage credit and liquidity risks (unenforceability  of netting arrangements,  bankruptcy  laws may force
payments to be revoked, no validity of interests  in pledged collateral). In general, legal risks can arise
from three different sources.  First, rules may not clearly allocate responsibilities  (liabilities  or losses)
23  See Payne, Myriam, May 1999, Risks in Payments Systems, presented  in the  Thomas Murray Global
Custody Conference on Minimizing Risk in Clearing, Payment and Settlement Systems held at New York
May 24-25 1999.
24  Note  that this risk  is non existent when there is simultaneity in the transfer of securities and funds.
However, it could be that even in the absence of this simultaneity, DvP is accomplished,  provided that there
is delivery if and only if there is  payment and vice versa.
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among the parties to a payment. Second,  rules may fail to address  payment  authenticity  and security  (i.e.,
gaps in the legislation). Finally,  they may provide  a favored  position  to either payment service providers
or  users.  Ambiguous or conflicting statutes, poorly written regulations and  ill-conceived private
contracts governing securities  transactions  can also exacerbate these problems. A particular weakness
can arise in situations when there may very well be appropriate laws in place but the willingness to
enforce  the laws is weak or non existent.
Custody risk is the risk of loss of securities  held in custody  occasioned  by the insolvency, negligence  or
fraudulent action of the custodian or a sub-custodian. If the security is maintained  directly  by its owner
by means of a physical certificate  this risk stems from the possibility  of stolen or lost securities (own
custody risk).  Custody  risk can also be influenced  by weaknesses  connected with operational  and legal
risks.
Cross-border  settlement risk 25 is the risk that one party to a cross-border  transaction" will deliver the
security it sold but not receive the related funds or pay for the security  it bought  but not receive delivery
of the security. In cross-border  transactions  the enforcement  risk is of critical importance  and care must
be taken to ensure enforceability  in all relevant  jurisdictions.
Finally, from a risk perspective,  a situation  can arise in which a problem  created  by one counterparty  can
affect the capacity  of others to settle and thus trigger a domino  effect. Systemc risk is defined as the risk
that the inability of one participant  to meet its required obligations  will cause other participants to be
unable to meet their obligations  when  due. 27
Management initiatives,  procedures,  and  tools have been developed  to mitigate the impact of the risks
described  above. Table 3 presents  a range of risk  management  tools and the associated  targeted risk:
Table  3. Risk Management  Tools  for Securities  Clearance  and Settlement  Systems
Risk  Risk Management  Tools
Credit Risk  Admission  Standards:  Clearing agents often maintain membership
requirements  to ensure financial  stability  of its participants  assuring  that every
member  is creditworthy  upon admission. They normally  include requirements
such  as  minimum  capital  levels,  liquidity  requirements,  operational
capabilities and, in some cases, approval from the appropriate regulatory
bodies.  It is very difficult  to evaluate a participant's overall financial  health
when it is involved  in activities across  multiple markets. In addition,  there is
an important  trade-off  between  a safe system  and a broad and fair participation
in the market.
25  In the context offoreign exchange risk it is sometimes referred as Herstatt risk
26  A transaction between counterparties  located in different countries.
27  In  this regard, the BIS (CPSS) has recently introduced the concept of systemically important payments
systems, that is, systems which could trigger or transmit systemic disruptions in the financial area because
of the size or nature of individual  payments which they handle or because of the aggregate value of the
payments processed  Vid  BIS  (CPSS), December  1999, Core  Principles  for  Systemically Important
Payment Systems.
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Risk  Risk Management Tools
Credit  Risk  Monitoring  members' creditworthiness:  In addition  to admission  standards
participants  have to submit copies  of their financial  statements  and are subject
to periodic  reviews.
Novation:  Satisfaction  and discharge of existing contractual obligations by
means  of their replacement  by new obligations. In the context of the securities
clearance  and settlement  system  the clearing agent sometimes  guarantees the
delivery  and receipt of settlement  obligations,  becoming the counterparty  to
each trade.  However, novation moves the credit risk to the clearing agent
obliging this  institution to implement risk management tools  to face this
exposure.
Clearing  Fund: Contributions  from participants  to cover losses which might
take place during  business  operation.
Buy ins and Sell outs:  These are settlement assurance procedures that, in
case of a settlement failure,  allow the buy of securities in the market at the
seller (who  failed) cost (buys-in)  or the sale of securities  in the market at the
buyer (who  failed) cost (sell-outs).
Net debit caps: A net debit cap is the maximum  amount  that a participant is
permitted to  incur in  its net  debit position to  all other participants.  It
establishes  an upper limit to the exposure  that any participant can pose to the
system. It is normally linked  to the liquid resources  available for  the clearing
agent.  In order to be effective, transactions  that exceed a participant's net
debit cap should  be rejected.
Bilateral  credit  limits: Sometimes  clearing agents  require each participant  to
establish  a bilateral  credit limit  with each of the other  participants
Collateral:  Clearing  organizations require  collateral to  cover  certain
exposures. The type of collateral accepted  ranges from liquid assets such as
cash or government  securities to the securities cleared by the arrangement.
The concentration of collateral,  the legal perfection of the security interests
and adequate  valuation are issues  that have to be carefully  considered in order
to determine  the effectiveness  of the collateral. Bankruptcy  laws may affect
the  clearing organization's and  its  participants collateral interests due  to
different priorities among creditors and the so called "zero hour" rule or
simply  different  institutions  may have different  bankruptcy  procedures.
In  the  futures/commodity markets margins act  sometimes as  collateral.
Margin is a  good  faith deposit (of money, securities or  other financial
instruments)  assuring  that a future contract  will  be fulfilled. 28
28  In the equity markets, margin has another meaning. It is the money deposited with the broker that serves as
partial payment when purchasing securities. The money deposited with the broker is the difference between
the purchase value of the shares and the collateral value (haircut).
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Risk  Risk Management  Tools
Credit  Risk  Loss  Sharing  procedures (backed-up by  collateral):  Loss  sharing
procedures  ensure that settlement  occurs  in the event that a participant  fails. It
could be a system  that incentives  participants  to monitor and limit their credit
exposures with other participants.  Loss-sharing arrangements are usually
supported  by pledge  collateral.
Same-day settlement/Liquidity  facilities:  Same-day settlement eliminates
overnight exposures to failures and  accelerates the  availability of  funds.
Liquidity facilities  provide  same-day funds by means of clearing funds, repos
on government  securities,  letters of credit payable on demand, lines of credit,
arrangements  with participants  to supply funds on demand, etc.  Liquidity
facilities should  have short notice availability,  be diversified and not include
clauses or similar provisions  that allow the lender to back out of providing
timely  liquidity.
Replacement  Cost Risk  Mark to market: Clearing agents  sometimes  require all unsettled securities
or fail positions  to be marked  to market prices to reflect fluctuation  in market
prices  in order to keep obligations  as close  to market  prices as possible.
Operational  Risk  Back-up facilities:  If an operational  disaster should occur to the primary
computer  system,  back-up  systems  provide  infrastructure to  resume
processing  within  a brief period  of time (60 to 90 minutes) at a secondary  site.
Automated  Recovery:  Duplication  of  databases  for  instantaneous
availability  in the event  of a database  device failure.
Fraud Risk  Encryption/decryption:  Encryption is the process of disguising a message
(using mathematical  formulas  called algorithms)  in such a way as to hide its
substance. Decryption  is the restoration  of encrypted data to its original  text.
Encryption systems prevent electronic intruders from obtaining information
that could be used to make  unauthorized  transfer  of funds.
Authentication  Procedures: Authentication  is the process of verifyuing  the
identification  of the true sender of a message and also that the text of the
message itself  has not been altered.
Access  controls: Such as unique  user identification  codes  and passwords
Cross-Border  Settlement
Risk
Principal  Risk  Credit assessment and control:  A careful analysis of potential trading
counterparties and  the  establishment of  limits  on  exposure  to  each
counterparty constitutes a  major  defense against default risk  in  foreign
exchange  trading.
Netting (multilateral or  bilateral):  Netting is an  agreed offsetting of
obligations by trading partners.  It reduces a  large number of  individual
obligations  to a smaller number. It constitutes  a way to reduce  the magnitude
of risk in foreign  exchange.
Extended  Exposures  Operations Improvements:  Operations procedures should allow to halt
outgoing  payments  or securities  up to settlement  day.
Arrangements  with correspondent  banks: To withhold  payments.
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A METHODOLOGY TO ASSESS  COUNTRY  SYSTEMS  BASED ON INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS
A number of international  standards  and best practices  have been produced and are useful in assessing
the quality of a securities clearance  and settlement  system.  Annex 2 contains references to the major
sources of standards. These were used as the starting point in developing  the assessment methodology
that is being used as an integral  component of the WHI.  The methodology is being used as a tool for
undertaking structured assessments of securities clearance  and settlement systems in countries visited
during the Initiative and has provided a  sound basis for identifying improvement opportunities.  A
summary of the methodology,  expressed  in matrix format, is included  in Annex 1  of this paper. 29
A review of existing standards suggested that they had been designed to address specific problem
situations and in certain cases may not be immediately relevant to the conditions found in emerging
markets.  For this reason, the methodology  used during the WH  does not focus on the application of
individual standards. Rather, it takes a broader view based on an assessment of the way in which the
29  The  first version of the matrix  was prepared  in the context  of the Initiative  by the securities  team that
visited  Chile  in  December  1999  and included.  De La Lastra,  Inigo (Comision  Nacional  del Mercado  de
Valores,  CNMt Spain); Guad9millas,  Mario  eWorld Bank) and Hosttinen,  Eita  tFinancial  Supervision
Authority,  FSA  Finland).  The  document  was  modified  by  the  securities  team  that  visited  Trinidad  and
Tobago in February  2000 and included:  Guadamillas,  Mario  eWorld  Bank); Salas,  Andrea (Comisi6n
Nacional  de Valores,  CNV Argentina)  and Saverson,  Ester (US Securities  Exchange  Commission,  US
SEC).  The matrix has benefutedfrom  comments  of the rest of the international  teams that visited the
countries,  local authorities,  the core  team  of the  project  and  IAC  members.
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main issues discussed earlier in this paper are addressed in the individual  systems being assessed. The
assessment  methodology  focuses on seven significant  issues: clearing and settlement  process, settlement
risks, legal issues, regulatory  oversight issues, clearing  and settlement  institutions  and their participants,
safeguarding  issues and system capacity. They are discussed separately,  for analytic purposes, although
it is clearly  recognized  that strong  inter-relationships  exist between  each issue. In addition,  three specific
sections are included to deal with the particularities  of government  securities  clearance  and settlement,
cooperation with the payments systems" and international  linkages.  A primary objective is stated in
each case along with a note of the characteristics  that are believed  to best influence  the realization of the
objective.
1.  Clearing and Settlement Process
Objective: To have prompt and reliable systems  for  processing trades, that are cost-
effective and convenient to use.
The clearance  and settlement process includes  capturing  trade information,  trade matching,  confirming
and affirming  institutional  investor's trades, clearing,  and settlement. Various intemational  organizations
have attempted  to set standards  for the prompt,  efficient  and effective  trade processing,  including  its cost-
effectiveness  (both, in terms of system  operation  and fees paid by participants),  and ease and convenience
of use.  Traditionally,  many systems  have been designed with settlement occurring on T+5.  One of the
most widely recognized  concepts  is that the longer  it takes  to settle a securities  trade  the greater  is the risk
that settlement  may not take place.  In this regard, the G30 recommended  that trade settlement should
occur by T+3 or less. Clearly  the shortest  possible  elapsed  time between  trade date and settlement  date is
a  desirable goal in system design.  However, the practical impact of shortening this time must be
assessed,  especially if it has an impact on the number of trades that fail to settle. 31 Same day settlement
could be considered  as the final goal, although  it is generally  recognized  that this may not be achievable
in the shortlmedium  term, particularly for cross-border  transactions.  The magnitude of the changes
required to achieve a particular standard must also be carefully considered.  For example, whereas it
might be relatively easy to move from T+5 to T+3 by simply imposing more discipline on all system
participants;  more fundamental  changes (process  re-engineering)  in all aspects of the system  are likely to
be necessary  to move to T+2 or T+1.
The profile of market investors (retail vs. wholesale, amount of foreign investment) as well as their
intermediaries  should be taken into account  as this can influence  the practicality  of the targeted clearing
and settlement  cycle. Appropriate  trade-offs  between  risk, cost, and convenience  must be made, else the
system will not satisfy user requirements  at an affordable and acceptable cost and thus might constrain
market development.
Another widely recognized concept is that trade matching should occur as soon after the trade as
possible.  G30 recommended that trade comparison should be accomplished by T+l.  In addition,
G30 recommended that indirect market participants -- institutional investors and custodians -- should
30  The content of the government securities and cooperation within the payments systems sections are based
on the work that the payments team developed in the assessment of Trinidad & Tobago systems in the
context of the WHI.  The team was coordinated by Massimo Cirasino (WB) and included Paolo di Blasi
(Payments System Consultant),  Paola Giucca (Bank of Italy) and Derrelle Janey (Federal  Reserve Bank of
New York).
31  Currently, there is a debate about the adequacy of moving the settlement cycle to T+2. However, given the
globalization  process in  financial markets, there is an increasing necessity to standardize this process at an
international  level, even if this could imply that some countries should increase their settlement cycle.
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be  members  of a  trade  comparison system that  achieves positive  affirmation of  trade  details.
Moreover, there should also be an integration system for trade matching, comparison and book-entry
settlement of securities and funds.  An automated link between the Exchange/OTC and the CSD is
generally considered to be desirable and is a prerequisite for broker/dealer straight through processing
from execution to settlement.  Likewise, when clearing and depository services are provided by
different entities, it is recommended that these two functions are closely tied together, otherwise
finality of settlement is difficult to achieve. Fortunately,  the cost of implementing automated systems
is reducing, however, care should be taken to ensure that sufficient transaction volume exists and that
users are willing to pay for the automated services based on tangible benefits in terms of efficiency or
risk reduction.
Intra-day processing cycles are a good indicator of the processing  efficiency  of a settlement system. In
essence, periodic settlement is better than a single end of day settlement mechanism. The greater the
number of intra-day  clearing cycles, the greater  the flexibility it gives to the user. In addition, multiple
processing  cycles  facilitate  the effective  linking  of settlement  systems,  particularly  across  time-zones.
Because of  increased automation and globalization of  securities markets, it is beneficial from an
interconnectivity perspective for  domestic  systems  to  use  internationally recognized  securities
identification  numbering standards. With this in mind, the G30 recommended that all markets should
adopt a numbering  system  that meets  the International  Securities  Identification  Number (ISIN) standards.
To facilitate  comprehensive  coverage,  especially  from a market  price perspective,  it is also desirable  that
regulators  encourage  the development  of a settlement  procedure  for off-market  trades. These procedures
should be similar  if not the same  as for the regulated  market  executed  trade.
Finally, specific attention should be given to the need to achieve one of the acceptable forms of DvP
through appropriate  linkages  with the national  payment systems.
2.  Settlement  Risks
Objective: To achieve  final and irrevocable  DvP and achieve efficiency  and safety in the overall
settlement  process.
The important issues of efficiency and flexibility have been touched on previously. The safety of the
system is paramount from a  participant and a  regulatory perspective and should be  given specific
attention. The settlement process exposes market participants  and clearance  and settlement systems to
different  risks (see topic 4). The system should  be designed  to minimize  these risks.
The major settlement  risk is counterparty  risk. DvP is one of the primary means by which a market can
reduce the risk inherent in securities  transactions. The DvP  concept seeks to eliminate  principal risk from
securities  transactions  by ensuring that sellers give up their securities if, and only if, they receive full
payment and vice versa.  There are three essential elements in a DvP transaction:  (a) good and
irrevocable  delivery of securities,  (b) final and irrevocable  funds, and (c) simultaneous  exchange.  The
CPSS of the BIS has identified three different models of DvP. 32 Although  these models vary in their
approach  to achieving  DvP, all three models  meet the concept  of real DvP.
An important  related concept is settlement  assurance. This  can be defined  as the arrangement  by which a
system seeks to  remove counterparty  risk (principal, replacement cost, and liquidity risk) from its
32  Vid. Delivery  versus  Payment  in Securities  Settlement  Systems,  1992, CPSS, BIS.
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participants. 33 Settlement  assurance  can be achieved in different  ways including  novation, legislation  or
government rules and rules and regulations issued by CSDs and exchanges.  It is important that the
system provides information  that facilitates  the monitoring and management of exposures at all times.
Well designed information  systems  are essential  ingredients  and must be embedded  in even the simplest
of systems.
There are a  variety of risk management procedures to  reduce market risk and  strengthen a  DvP
mechanism (see table 3).  Those procedures include admission standards, member's creditworthiness
monitoring, novation, participation funds, collateral, margins, buy-ins and sell-outs, net debit caps,
bilateral credit limits and loss sharing arrangements.  Most settlement systems use more than one
procedure  to minimize  market risk. In addition,  there are a number  of mechanisms  designed  to improve
the settlement  process. Among  them are: central  lending  facilities;  pledge recording facilities  and prompt
re-registration procedures.  Properly regulated securities lending and borrowing can bring significant
benefits to a market and its users leading to more liquid markets.  Short selling could be a  useful
mechanism to add liquidity.  However, when short selling is permitted, regulation  must guard against
manipulative  practices,  including  those associated  with  a significant  short position.
Systems that are considering  implementing  RTGS or netting should carefully study market volume and
participation  to determine if these mechanisms  are appropriate (see topic 3).  Historically,  netting was
introduced  as an efficient  measure  to reduce the amount of physical  documents  passing between market
members. Later, with the introduction  of early computer systems,  it was used to reduce the number of
electronic settlements. Today, with high speed and powerful  computers  and the introduction  of RTGS
systems, the efficiency advantages are less important.  Thus, the debate is focused on the trade-off
between liquidity  requirements  and risk mitigation  as discussed  previously in  this paper.
Settling in same day funds 34 is essential when operating in an RTGS environment and is useful in
achieving real intra-day DvP.  In order to achieve timely and risk-free settlement in same day funds,
efficient  banking arrangements  will need to be developed  that will enable  funds to be moved quickly and
relatively  inexpensively. As payments systems  are normally  under the jurisdiction of the national central
bank, cooperation in the  area of payments system and securities system integration by  regulatory
authorities is very important to ensure that the banking system  can support the securities  clearance  and
settlement system.  An important issue that inevitably arises relates to payment system access, and
especially  the way in which a CSD has access (direct or indirect)  to the payments system. This is not a
simple issue to resolve.  Central banks typically are not in favor of allowing a non-bank  to have direct
access to a large value transfer system  and the associated central bank provided liquidity arrangements.
Some form of compromise  can however  be reached providing  that decisions  are taken that are in the best
interest of the whole financial sector.  For example, a  CSD might  be allowed to have a settlement
account  at the central  bank but not have access  to central  bank credit.
Finality of both payments and securities' ownership  transfer is a crucial factor in the development  of a
securities market. Otherwise,  only local investors  will operate in the market based on well established
client relationships  and the confidence  that this provides. In emerging  markets, this factor is of critical
importance if there is a  desire to attract foreign investment.  Foreign investors will be reluctant to
3  There  are  two types  of arrangements  that are  typically  referred  to as settlement  assurance  schemes. One is
used  to guarantee  the  payment  of net  payments  obligations  arising  out of a settlement  system. The  other is
used to guarantee  the settlement  of transactions  that have not yet reached  their settlement  date (future
settlements).
34  Payment is made in "same day" funds when payment of such funds is made on an irrevocable basis to the
counterparty on the day of settlement  such that they are available  for use on the day of settlement.
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participate in a market that is not considered to be safe and sound.  Securities finality is difficult to
achieve, even with securities immobilization  and dematerialization. For example, bearer or registered
securities could be forged and the problem not identified until the bearer security is redeemed or the
registered security lodged with the registry. Payments finality is equally important. The separation of
oversight functions  between  the securities  market  regulator  and the payments system  regulator  should not
present insurmountable  problems. An acceptable solution can always be achieved through discussion
and resolution  of conflicts  even if this implies compromise.
3.  Legal issues
Objective: To establish sound legal basis that is also able to  accommodate technological
advances in the operation  of the system.
A variety of laws and legal concepts can effect the performance  of clearing and settlement systems.
Contract laws, company laws, bankruptcy  and insolvency  laws, custody laws and property laws may
impede the performance  of a clearing system. Some of the legal aspects have been mentioned in relation
to other main issues. The general need is to have an adequate legal basis that is able to accommodate
technological advances and, in this way, does not constitute a  constraint for the operation or future
development  of the system. Also, the lack of legal recognition  of certain concepts such as nominee35or
fungibility 36 may limit a system's ability to protect itself from certain settlement risks.  If a system is
using a netting scheme to clear and settle  transactions,  a sound legal basis for netting including  the legal
recognition  of novation  should  be in place.
Another important emerging issue is the legal status of digital signatures. If digital signatures are to
substitute  for handwritten  signatures,  they must have the same legal status as handwritten  signatures, i.e.,
they must be legally binding.  Finally, procedures for creating and enforcing a pledge of interests in
securities should be simplified in order to encourage the collateralization  of credit exposure in an
immobilized  or dematerialized  system.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, a critical need is to ensure that laws are both enforced and are
enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions.  In addition, disputes should become the  subject of court
proceedings only as a last resort.  This can be achieved through the specification and acceptance of
comprehensive  and fair arbitration  processes  that are clear and non-ambiguous.
4.  Regulatory  Oversight  Issues
Objective: The system  for  clearance  and settlement  of securities transactions  should be subject
to regulatory oversight,  and designed to ensure that it is fair, effective  and efficient and that it
reduces systemic risk
Regarding regulatory oversight by the authorities, a specific allocation of responsibility for securities
clearance  and settlement  supervision  would  be ideal. However, in most cases, this function is performed
together with the general supervision  of the participant  entities  without any special attention  being given
35  A nominee is a person or entity named by another to act on his behalf. A nominee is commonly used in a
securities transaction to obtain registration and legal ownership of a security.  Legal ownership is the
recognition in the law as the owner of a security while beneficial ownership/interest is the entitlement to
receive some or all of the benefits of a security (e.g., income, voting rights,  power to transfer).
36  Fungibility is the method of holding  securities by a CSD in which the owner of a security has the right to a
certain amount of this security in a fungible pool and not to any particular physical  or dematerialized
security.
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to  clearance and  settlement issues.  There is  a  trend towards regulatory oversight policy being
implemented at two levels that is substituting for traditional  direct supervisory activity.  The regulator
conducts the oversight  of the Self-Regulatory  Organizations  (SROs) (CSDs, exchanges)  activities,  while
these institutions  perform the same function  with regard  to its participants. 37
A securities regulator should have the authority to license central clearinghouses and CSDs (System
Operators)  as SROs and review and approve their rules. As an SRO, a system  operator should have the
authority  to make and enforce rules on its participants. The securities  regulator  should have the power to
issue the guidelines that system operators should follow.  In addition, the securities regulator should
assure  that the rules and procedures  issued  by SROs  permit  a sound and effective  operation  of the system
and provide fair access to all market  participants. The securities  regulator  should also have the authority
to conduct  periodic inspections,  require  the production  of periodic  reports  and enforce the securities laws
and regulations.
However, if the regulatory authority  is a service  provider,  the potential  conflict  between  this operational
activity and its oversight role should be considered.  This conflict is more important in payments
clearance and settlement systems where the central bank operates systems that might be viewed as
competing with the  private sector.  In the  securities context, government securities clearance and
settlement services are sometimes operated by central banks but normally without competing with the
private  sector. 38
5.  Clearing and settlement  institutions  and their participants
Objective:  To take advantage  of economies  of scale.
It is widely accepted  that a securities  market should be supported by the CSD with the broadest possible
industry participation. Admission  should be open to all qualified  market participants needing access to
the CSD. 9
Membership  standards for system operators should be established in order to minimize risk.  Certain
minimum standards of financial responsibility,  operational capacity (including system security and
integrity),  experience  and competence  should be prescribed  for participation  in the systems. Mandatory
capital requirements  for participants are the first safety net to mitigate against a participant failure and,
thus, an important risk management tool.  However, these requirements are frequently established for
reasons other than clearance and settlement  and a system  operator should have the authority to impose
higher financial standards on  its  members/participants  if  the  general requirements do  not  cover
adequately  the perceived  risks.
The rules for clearing and depository organizations  should avoid unfair discrimination  in regard to the
admission  of participants  or among participants  in the use of the system. The rules should provide fair
procedures  for review of decisions concerning  denials of access. In addition,  the system should provide
participants with a  meaningful opportunity to participate in the administration of the organization's
affairs.
37  For a complete analysis of regulatory oversight in payments systems vid  Banca d'Italia, November 1999,
White Paper on Payment System Oversight.
38  For a detailed analysis of  oversight issues vid. Banca d'Italia, November 1999, White Paper on Payment
System Oversight: Objectives, Methods,  Areas of Interest.
39  The cost is an important element to consider in order to avoid an unfair situationfor the minority investor.
In any case, transactions cost per unit should be clearly identified.
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6. Safeguard Policies
Objective: To  safeguard  securities,  funds and all associated  records.
Securities clearance and  settlement operators must have  a  demonstrable capability to  safeguard
securities and funds in their custody or control or for which it is responsible, and for protecting
against reasonably anticipated internal or external threats to the integrity of its operations.  In many
markets, settlement is carried out and controlled  through automatic data processing systems.  In these
cases, the system should have appropriate procedures to back-up data and a contingency plan to
minimize disruptions.
Electronic technologies now in place or under development,  such as the use of internet for initiating
financial  transactions  increase  consumer choice  but at the same time provide additional  means for abuse
and illegal activity.  Safeguards should anticipate,  and be designed to provide protection against the
possibility  of theft, accidental  or malicious  destruction  or loss of securities  or funds and the possibility  of
accidental  or intentional,  but unauthorized,  modification,  disclosure  or destruction  of data.
In connection with these objectives, the organization  should have an adequately  staffed internal audit
department  which has the authority  to review,  monitor,  and evaluate  the organization's system  of internal
controls and the integrity  of the operational  procedures.
In summary,  particular attention  is required  to reduce fraud. Some of the issues to be addressed are: (a)
the  operational security of  systems including identification systems, message authentication and
protection  measures in safeguarding  access to the system; (b) to ensure protection  against insider fraud;
(c) to have a regular independent  audit of the systems to ensure continued system integrity;  and (d) the
determination  of liability  for loss or technical  failure.
7. System capacity
Objective: To  provide the system with an adequate  operational  capacity.
The central clearance  and settlement  system  should maintain  an adequate capacity  to process current and
anticipated  future transaction  volume,  including  projected  peak day and peak hour volume demands . To
achieve this, the operator must:  (a) establish formal current and future capacity estimates for their
automated  trade comparison systems;  (b) conduct  periodic  capacity stress tests to determnine  the behavior
of systems under a variety of simulated  conditions;  and (c) conduct independent  annual reviews to asses
whether these systems can perform  adequately  at their current and estimated  future capacity  levels.
Operational capacity must also be  demonstrated to  exist at  the mandatory disaster-recovery site.
Operators must also have in place a well designed and adequately tested mechanism for transferring
system control to the back-up site in an acceptable time-frame without loss of data or unacceptable
reduction  in service levels.
GOVERNMENT  SECURITIES  CLEARANCE  AND SETTLEMENT
Government  securities  markets  are of significant  importance  in a country's financial  sector. Government
securities  are  used  extensively to  carry  out  monetary policy through  open  market  operations.
Furthermore, in many countries government  securities  pricing provides  benchmarks for wider financial
markets. Frequently,  an important  objective of macro-financial  policy is the development  of a deep and
efficient secondary  market for government  securities. In conjunction  with appropriate primary market
arrangements,  such a market is able also to reduce the cost of financing  for the government. Sound and
efficient procedures  for the trading  of government  securities  are an essential  element for the development
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of this market. In many countries,  a successful  implementation  of well designed  clearance  and settlement
mechanisms has represented a key milestone in the development of the overall market.  Due to the
peculiar characteristics  of the government  securities  market, in many countries  central banks  are involved
or manage directly the clearance and settlement mechanisms as well as the book entry systems that
record securities ownership.  As mentioned previously, central banks frequently own and operate a
nation's large value funds transfer system.  Ownership of the book entry system as well as the funds
transfer system  facilitates  implementation  of intraday  DvP arrangements.
The relative  policy and operational  role of the central  bank, and  the operational  role of stock exchanges  in
regard to the government securities  markets must be taken into account during any assessment of the
overall securities  market arrangements. This is of particular importance  to fnancial system stability as
trades in govermnent  securities  tend to be of higher value as compared  with equities  trades.
COOPERATION IN THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM
Effective cooperation among market participants and regulators is essential for the development  of a
sound and efficient set of national payment system  mechanisms. The specific needs of the securities
markets should be satisfied  along with the needs of all other  users.
A number of specific problems should be anticipated and resolved during the preparation of a national
payments system vision designed to satisfy the needs of all users and not only the needs of the banks.
Active involvement  of all users in the decision making process will remove the potential  for problems
and will result in an agreed strategy,  organizational  arrangements,  and operational  procedures. Territorial
differences  between regulators should not get in the way of sound decision making and willingness to
cooperate  as this can lead to "sub-optimal"  solutions  that impact  the system's reliability  and efficiency.
CROSS-BORDER  SECURITIES CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT
A  truly global securities market requires the establishment  of efficient and automated international
securities clearance and  settlement systems to  facilitate cross-border settlement.  Furthermore, the
inability to settle cross-border  transactions  could also have a domestic  effect, and problems in domestic
systems could have an impact  on linked  markets. The growing  importance  of cross-border  settlement  has
significant implications  for systemic  risk. Most local domestic  systems have been designed  to meet local
market needs.  For this reason, an assessment of a country system should include an analysis of how
cross-border  transactions  are settled  if this type of trading is significant. 40
In a cross-border  trade, counterparties  are located in different  countries. A cross-border  settlement  takes
place when the securities  are settled in one country in a way that is different from the country in which
one or both of the counterparties  are located.  Risks faced by cross-border participants present some
particularities  compared  to domestic  settlements  and depend  on the way that the transaction  is processed.
There are several  ways to effect a cross-border  transaction:
Through direct access to (membership in) the CSD in the country of issue, although CSDs
normally prohibit foreign residents from becoming participants.  Furthermore, even if direct
40  For a detailed  analysis  of issues  and  specific  risks associated  with cross-border  securities  settlement  vid
BIS, March 1995, Cross-Border  Securities Settlements.
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access were allowed, it is unlikely that foreign residents would opt for this solution as the
establishment  of local banking arrangements would also be necessary.
*  Through a local agent, perhaps still the most common method, that holds securities and
settles trades for non-residents through an account it maintains for its customers at the local
CSD.
a  Many institutional investors use global custodians rather than  local agents to settle their
cross-border trades.  A global custodian settles the non resident's trades in the local market
through a local agent acting as its sub-custodian.
*  The  International  Central  Securities  Depository  (ICSD)  settles  the  majority  of  their
participant's  trades on their own books under their own rules and  operating procedures.
ICSD also supports trades and financial  transactions with other ICSDs and counterparties that
settle their trades in the local markets.
*  CSD-to-CSD links permit the interconnection of securities clearance and settlement systems
in different countries without compromising the essential soundness and integrity of each
national system.  Different varieties of settlement and custody services for the linked entities
exist.  The FIBV 41 identified three types of models:
a)  Cross-border  links  between  two  CSDs  for  delivery  and  receipt  of  securities
without payment  facilities.
b)  Cross-border  links as above with payment  facilities.
c)  Cross-border  settlement  links  between  two  clearing  organizations  providing  for
trade accounting,  securities  settlement,  custody  and settlement  facilities  with  each
clearing organization  linked to its national CSD.
Some of the specific problems  that could arise in cross-border  settlement  are listed below:
*  The involvement of multiple  jurisdictions raise the issue of choice of law and conflict of laws
that complicates the analysis of the legal environment and could introduce new sources of
risk.  This is especially important when collateralized intraday loans are provided as the
choice of law and conflicts of law can introduce ambiguities about the effectiveness of the
liens involved.
*  There is a potential for foreign exchange settlement risk.
*  A non-resident may need to maintain larger balances of cash and securities than a  direct
participant would in order to settle the same  type of transactions.
*  The use of local agents, global custodians or ICSDs may exacerbate custody risk due to
further tiering of securities  holdings.
4  Vid FIB  V June 1989,  Improving  International  Settlement
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*  The settlement of back-to-back trades 42 by dealers that are not direct participants in the local
CSDs creates difficulties in some settlement systems, and dealers are often forced to borrow
securities  or pre-position securities  to meet delivery obligations.
*  Direct  and  indirect links among CSDs and  ICSDs could  involve significant operational
inefficiencies in the exchange of information  between systems.
*  Differences between the operating hours of the ICSDs and the operating hours and settlement
practices (especially finality rules) of national payments systems and local CSDs require the
ICSDs to make credit extensions to their participants that are of unusually large size and long
duration.
*  Authorities in a home country may not become promptly aware of a disturbance to a cross-
border  settlement arrangement.  Furthermore, once a  problem becomes apparent, a  high
degree  of  coordination among  several  authorities in  the  home  country  and  in  other
jurisdictions is required. The important role of international intermediaries in a cross-border
settlement also complicates oversight of the domestic system.
The  above factors should be  taken  into account when  designing arrangements for  cross-border
settlement.  In the case of direct and indirect links, linked entities should share a set of minimum
standards in order to improve  efficiency  and reduce settlement  risks. 43 In particular,  they must carefully
consider how differences  in the rules and procedures  of the linked systems  affect settlement  risks.
CONCLUDING  REMARKS
This paper has been written to evoke discussion  and, therefore, should be viewed as a work-in-progress
designed  to provide input into the on-going  work that is focusing  on the development  of core principles
and minimum  standards  relating  to integrated  payments and securities  clearance  and settlement  systems.
It is an attempt to fill a current gap in the set of evaluation  tools that are available to assessors of such
systems, especially those that are required to assess evolving systems in developing and transitional
economies. In particular,  the authors will welcome  comments  relating  to ways in which the Assessment
Matrix illustrated  in Annex I might  be improved.
42  A back-to-back  trade is a pair of transactions  that requires  a counterparty  to receive  and redeliver  the
same  securities  on the same  day.
4  For a detail  analysis  of these  minimum  standards  vid.  IOSCO,  July 1990,  Clearing  and  Settlement,  Report
of the Technical  Committee.
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ANNEX I.  SECURITIES CLEARANCE  AND  SETTLEMENT MATRIX
Relevantfactors  Components  Standards  Status  in the  Recomnmendallons Country
1 - Clearing and Settlement  1.1 Settlement cycle  - A market should achieve settlement by three days after trade date.  (T+3), (G30-7)
processes:  1.2 Trade  matching  - Trade  matching  should  occur  as soon after  the trade  as possible. All comparisons  of trades
Objective:  to have  prompt  between  market  participants  should  be done by T+l.  (G30-1,  IOSCO13.10)
and reliable  systems  in  - If possible,  automated  links  should  be established  between  the trading system  and the
processing trades, a cost-  settlement system. (IOSCO13.10)
effective  and a convenient
system  for its participants  1.3 Trace  confirmation  /  - Institutional  investors  and custodians  should  be members  of a trade comparison  system  that
affirmation  achieves  positive  affirmation  of trade details. (G30-2,  FIBV2)
1.4  System  integration  - There  should  be an integrated  central  system  for trade  matching,  book  entry  settlement  of
securities  and  book entry  settlement  of payments.  (FIBV8.  15)
1.5 Common  message  - All traded securities  issues  should  have  had a security  identification  number  that meets  the
standard  Intemational  Securities  Industry  Numbering  (ISIN)  standards. (G30-9)
2 - Settlement  Risk  2.1  Final and irrevocable  - DvP  should  be employed  as the method  for settling  all securities  transactions.  (G30-5)
Objective:  Achieve  final and  delivery  versus
irrevocable  DP and improve  payment  (DvP)
the overall  efficiency  of the  2.2  Same  day funds  - Payments  associated  with securities  transactions  should  be made  in same-day  funds. (G30-
settlement  process  6)
- The system  should  provide  prompt  final settlement  on the day of value,  preferably  during
the day and at a minimum  at the end of the day. (CPIV)
2.3  Netting  and real time  - Netting  and  RTGS  are effective  settlement  mechanisms.  The  regulator  and market
gross  settlement  participants  should  study market  volumes  and  participation  to determine  which  mechanism
(RTGS)  as settlement  is appropriate  for their market  place  and have  a clear  understanding  of the financial  risks
methods  to reduce  affected  by the netting  process. (IOSCO  13.11.2,  Lll, CPII)
risk  - Multilateral  netting  schemes  should  have  clearly  defined  procedures,  ensure  settlement  in
the case  of inability  to settle  by the participant  with  the largest  single  net-debit  position  and
have  publicly  disclosed  criteria  for admission  which  permit  fair and open access. (Llll,
LIV, LV,  CPIII, CPV,  CPLX)
2.4  Asset  segregation  - The  pool of securities  or interests  held in a depository  should  be protected  against  the
claims  of the depository's  and  broker's general  creditors.  (IOSC02)
2.5  Settlement  assurance  - Margin  requirements  may be used in combination  with other  mechanisms  to manage  risk to
procedures  market  participants,  clearinghouses  and exchanges.  (IOSCO13.1  1,  EU6)
2.6  Liquidity  risk  - Central  clearing  organizations  and  CSDs  (System  Operators)  should  maintain  adequate
sources  of liquidity  to meet their  financial  obligations  on a timely  basis. Reliance  on one
source may  pose significant  risks  in the event  of a financial  crisis,  and  consideration  should
be given  to diversifying  liquidity  sources  to reduce  such  risks. The  level of necessary
liquidity  sources  should  be based  on an assessment  of the risks to which  the organization  is
subject  and should  be  subject  to regulatory  review.  (TCI.2,  G30-8,  IOSCO  13.11.3)
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Relevantfactors  Components  Standards  Status in the  Recommendations Country
2.7  Short  selling  - Short selling  is regarded  as a useful  mechanism  in some  jurisdictions  as an aid to liquidity.
Where  short  setting  is permitted,  regulation  must guard against  manipulative  practices,
including  those  associated  with  a significant  short  position. In some  jurisdictions  this
involves  a combination  of short  sales and securities  lending  and  restricting  short  sales to
liquid stocks.  Disclosure  of short  sales and  securities  lending  positions  (or,  at least,  their
reporting  to the regulator)  is a tool  for the  further  reduction  of risk. (IOSCO  13.11.3)
2.8  Securities  borrowing  - Securities  lending  and  borrowing  should  be encouraged  as a method  of expediting  the
settlement  of securities  transactions.  There  is a legitimate  and important  role for securities
lending  in those  markets  that permit  short selling. (TC2.3.8)
3 - Legal  issues  3.1  Netting  (legal  basis)  - There  should  be sound  legal basis  for netting  including  the legal  recognition  of novation.
Objective:  Sound  legal  basis  (LI,  CPI,  EUI,  FIBV5)
that is also able  to  3.2  Clear  definition  of  - There  should  be a clear  legal definition  of securities  property  rights. (EUla, IOSCOI,  CPI)
accommodate  technological  property  rights
advances  in the operation  of  3.3  Bankruptcy  and  - The pool  of securities  of interests  held in a depository  should  be protected  against  the
the system  insolvency  laws  claims  ofthe depository's  and  broker's general  creditors. (IOSCO2,  CPI)
3.4  Electronic  documents  - The law should  recognize  electronic  documents  and signatures  to facilitate  securities
and  signatures  trading  clearing  and settlement.  (CPI)
3.5  Conflicts  of laws  - There  should  be clear mechanisms  to resolve  legal uncertainties  and conflicts. (IOSCO4,
CPI)
3.6  Pledging  - Procedures  for creating  and enforcing  a pledge  of interests  in securities  should  be simplified
in order  to encourage  the collateralization  of credit exposure  in an immobilized  or
dematerialized system.  (IOSC05)
4 - Regulatory  oversight  issues  4.1  Regulation  of central  - The system  for clearance  and settlement  of securities  transactions  should  be subject  to
Objective:  The  system  for  clearinghouses  and  regulatory  oversight  and designed  to ensure  that it is fair, effective  and efficient  and that it
clearance  and  settlement  of  CSDs  as SROs  reduces  systemic  risk. (IOSCO13.9)
securities  transactions  should  - The securities  regulator  should  have the authority  to license  System  Operators  as SROs  and
be subject  to regulatory  review  and approval  their rules. (COSRA4)
oversight,  and  designed  to  - The participants  should  be subject  to supervision  by a governmental  authority  or self-
ensure  that it is fair,  effective  regulatory  authority  subject  to governmental  oversight. (COSRAI)
and efficient  and  that it  - As a SRO,  a central  clearinghouse  or CSD  should  have  sufficient  organizational  structure
reduces  systemic  risk  and  capacity  to enforce  its rules  and the securities  laws  and regulations. (TCI.3)
4.2  The  authority  to issue  - The securities  regulator  should  have  the power to issue  directions  (orders  and regulations)
directions  (orders  and  regarding  the clearance  and settlement  of securities  transactions  and clearing  and  settlement
directives)  participants.  (IOSCO13.9)
4.3  The authority  to  - The securities  regulatory  authority  should  have  the authority  to conduct  periodic  inspections
inspect  regulated  and require  reports  and enforce  securities  laws and regulations.  (COSRA3,  IOSCO13.9)
entities  and enforce
securities  laws and
regulations
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Relevantfactors  Components  Standards  Status in the  Recomnendations Country
4.4  Govemance of  - A System Operator should provide its participants with a meaningful opportunity to
clearinghouse and  participate in the administration of its affairs.  Participants should a fair voice in the manner
CSDs  in which decisions are made.  Participants should be kept adequately informed of proposed
rule changes and should be furnished with annual audited financial statements, an audited
annual report on internal controls and other relevant reports on a regular basis.  (TC 1.5,
CPX)
4.5  Adequacy of  - The securities regulator should have sufficient staff capability with appropriate knowledge
Resources to perform  and skills to perform its oversight responsibilities.  (IOSCO 13.8-13.9)
oversight
___  responsibilities
5.  Clearing and Settlement  5.1  Central Securities  - A CSD should be in place, and the broadest possible industry participation should be
Institutions and their  Depository (CSD)  encouraged.  A CSD's principal function is to immobilize or dematerialize securities,
participants  thereby assuring that the bulk of securities transactions are processed in book-entry form.
Objective:  Take advantage  The depository system provides the basis for achieving efficient and low risk transaction
of economies of scale of  settlements.  The most important feature of the book-entry method is that a transfer of a
settlement procedures  given quantity of an issuer from one account to another can be affected by a simple debit or
credit on the books of the CSD.  Other important features include trade clearance, safe
custody, and settlement/post settlement processing of securities and information, such as
corporate actions and dividend/interest processing.  (G30-3)
5.2  Membership Standards  - There should be an appropriate balance between the need for system security and broad
participation in the clearing and settlement system.  (COSRAI, LV, CPIX, EU5)
6.  Safeguarding Issues  6.1  Integrity of records  - A System Operator should be capable of protecting against reasonably anticipated internal
Objective:  Safeguarding of  or external threats to the integrity of its operations.  (COSRA5)
securities and funds under its  - A System Operator should have appropriate procedures to back-up data.  (TC 1.  1)
control  and associated  - A System  Operator  should  develop  contingency  plan  to  minimize  disruptions.  (TC  1.  I )
6.2  Safeguarding of  - A System Operator should have sufficient safeguards to ensure the safety of funds and
securities and funds  securities under its control.  (COSRA2, EU3)
7.  System Capacity  7.1  Operative capacity  - A System Operator should maintain adequate capacity to process reasonably anticipated
Objective:  Provide the  volume, including projected peak volume demands. A Systems Operator should establish
system with an adequate  formal current and future capacity estimates, conduct periodic capacity stress tests, and
operational capacity  conduct independent annual reviews to assess whether these systems can perform
adequately.  (COSRA5)
- A System Operator should have back up systems and contingency plans on how it will
operate in the event of computer failure or if the computers are unavailable because of a
disaster.  A System Operator should periodically test these back up systems and plans.  (TC
1.1, CPVII)
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ANNEX  II:  LIST OF STANDARDS  AND  BEST PRACTICES
This list is not intended to be a comprehensive listing of all the existing standards and best
practices related to securities clearance and settlement systems. The references are presented
below by  institution in alphabetical order, indicating the web site where the document is
directly available or there is information on how to access it.  The list also includes some
documents that were used to design the structure of the matrix even if there is not a direct
reference to them in the matrix.
Bank of International Settlements,  BIS (www.bis.org)
*  Minimum standards  for cross-border  and multi-currency  netting and settlement schemes
(Lamfalussy  minimum standards)-1990
Reference in the matrix: L I-VI
*  Delivery versus payment in securities settlement  systems, September 1992.
*  Real-time  gross settlement systems, March 1997.
*  Core Principles  for Systemically Important Payment  Systems, December 1999.
Reference in the matrix: CP I-X
Council of Securities Regulators of the Americas, COSRA
COSRA  principles of clearance and settlement -1996
Reference in the matrix: COSRA 1-5
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) (www.ecb.int)
Standards  for  the use of EU securities settlement  systems in ESCB credit operations -1998
Reference in the matrix: EU 1-6
Group of Thirty, G30 (www.group3O.org)
Group of thirty recommendations  regarding securities clearance and settlement (G30)-1989.
Reference in the matrix: G30 1-9
International Federation of Stock Exchanges,  FIBV (www.fivb.com)
*  Clearing and Settlement Best Practices -September 1999
Reference in the matrix: FIBV
International Services Securities  Association,  ISSA (www.issanet.org)
*  G30/ISSA Recommendations: 1997  Status Review, November 1997
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International Organization of Securities Commissions,  IOSCO (www.iosco.org)
*  Clearing and Settlement,  Report of the Technical Committee, July, 1990.
Reference in the Matrix: TC
*  Clearing and Settlement in Emerging Markets -A  Blueprint, Report of the Development
Committee (now called the Emerging Markets Committee),
October 1992.
*  Short Selling and Securities Lending. Issues  for Consideration,  A report by the Emerging
Markets Committee, May 1997
*  Towards a Legal Frameworkfor Clearing  and Settlement in Emerging Markets, Report of the
Emerging Markets Committee,  November 1997.
Reference in the Matrix: IOSCO  1-5
*  Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, Report of IOSCO, September 1998.
Reference  in the Matrix:  IOSC013.8-13.11
Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and Development  (OECD) (www.ocde.org)
*  Systemic Risks in Securities Markets, OECD Publication Service, Paris, 1991.
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